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Abstract
Targeted advertising can benefit consumers through lower prices for access to websites.
Yet, if consumers dislike that websites collect their personal information, their welfare
may go down. We study competition for consumers between websites that can show
targeted advertisements. We find that more targeting increases competition and reduces
the websites’ profits, but yet in equilibrium websites choose maximum targeting as they
cannot credibly commit to low targeting. A privacy protection policy can be beneficial for
both consumers and websites. If consumers are heterogeneous in their concerns for privacy,
a policy that allows choice between two levels of privacy will be better. Optimal privacy
protection takes into account that the more intense competition on the high-targeting
market segment also benefits consumers on the less competitive segment. Consumer
surplus is maximized by allowing them a choice between a high targeting regime and a
low targeting regime which affords more privacy.
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1. Introduction
In 2015, internet advertising revenues in the US for the first time exceeded 17 billion dollars
per quarter. The share of internet advertising has been rising steadily, currently totalling a
third of total US advertising revenues, and almost equals that of broadcast television.1
Internet advertising allows for more precise targeting, compared to traditional media.2
Whereas a television commercial will be the same for all those watching a particular show,
and therefore tailored to consumers’ average interests conditional on their watching the show,
the internet allows targeting on each individual’s specific characteristics.
Targeting of advertisements is valuable to advertisers as it increases the probability that
the advertisement leads to a purchase. This is also reflected in pricing schemes, which are
increasingly based on click-through rates or other performance measures, rather than mere
numbers of viewers. A website that can target its advertisements better will collect higher
per-viewer revenues from advertisers, which may be partly reflected in lower subscription prices
(if present) or higher quality to attract more visitors.
The advantages of targeting for advertisers induce firms to collect personal information on
their consumers. Personal information used for targeting includes keywords entered in search
engines, recent browsing history, previous web purchases or even the topics in their emails.
Web companies such as Axciom or Bluekai collect information on individuals’ web behaviour
and use that to categorize consumers into profiles, which they then sell on to advertising sites.3
Better targeting has a potential drawback for consumers: consumers may care about the
associated loss of privacy. Consumers have limited possibilities to verify what kind of personal
information firms collect and how they use this information. How well do firms protect personal
information against theft or manipulation by criminals? Do firms use personal information to
1As reported by the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s “Internet Advertising Revenue Re-
port”, 2016. See the annex to this paper, available at www.cpb.nl/en/publication/
targeted-advertising-platform-competition-and-privacy for an overview of facts and figures on
online advertising.
2Evans (2009) and Goldfarb (2014) provide overviews of the economics of online advertising.
3See e.g. “Who Do Online Advertisers Think You Are?”, New York Times, November 30, 2012. In the annex
to this paper, we describe the various types of players in this industry in more detail.
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raise prices for some groups of consumers? In addition, some internet users may feel uneasy
when they discover that their movements on the web may be recorded and reflected in the ads
they are shown.4
These privacy costs are heterogeneous across consumers. A survey by Turow et al. (2009)
shows that 66 percent of Americans does not want to have ads tailored to their personal
characteristics. Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) find that consumers increasingly refuse to disclose
sensitive information online, and Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) demonstrate that these costs are
economically relevant, in the sense that they alter consumers’ purchasing decisions in response
to advertising. See Tucker (2012) for an overview.
One response to such consumer uneasiness is for web companies to offer consumers a choice
on how much information can be collected on them. As an example, internet provider AT&T
offered customers a 29 dollar reduction on their monthly subscription bill if the firm can use
their information on browsing behaviour to better target the ads it shows them.5 Also, many
websites allow consumers either to opt for signing in to the site or to browse anonymously.
Signing in may increase the quality the site can offer, at the expense of the site storing previous
browsing history. Alternatively, consumers may choose not to accept cookies, or may join
industry “do-not-track” registers.
There may be a role for public intervention to protect online privacy. For one thing, many
consumers may be ill-informed about websites’ information gathering activities and privacy
policies. It is costly or impossible for consumers to verify whether the websites they visit collect
and use personal information. In the absence of verifiable contracts on the degree of privacy
protection, these sites may have trouble committing to a strict privacy policy. Government
intervention can help in providing a credible standard for privacy protection. Indeed, both in
the EU and in the US stricter online privacy laws are being put in place.
In this paper, we show that competition among websites may also drive sites to choose
4There are various forms of targeting, see the annex. In the case of retargeting, an ad for a product which
has been previously looked up on the internet may afterwards appear as a banner ad on completely unrelated
webpages. Consumers may feel watched and stalked by the product as a result, see e.g. “Web trackers are
totally out of control”, ITworld.com, March 21, 2013.
5“AT&T says your privacy is worth $ 29 a month”, Techtimes.com, Dec 12 2013.
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levels of privacy protection that are too low from their own perspective, as well as from their
consumers’ perspectives when these suffer costs from loss of privacy. The lower profitability
may explain why websites make endeavours to commit to reduced targeting, through standards
proposed by trade associations or private certification.6 Government regulation of privacy may
lead to a Pareto improvement, increasing both websites’ and consumers’ surplus.
We analyze a model of websites that act as two-sided platforms, matching advertisers to
consumers. The websites compete for consumers in a Hotelling fashion. Consumers visit
only one platform (single-homing). This implies that the websites are competitive bottlenecks
(Armstrong, 2006): websites are effectively gatekeepers for advertising access to consumers.
This allows them to extract monopoly rents from advertisers. Websites can strategically choose
the level of targeting of ads to their consumers. Advertisers have higher willingness to pay (per
consumer) for an ad that is better targeted at a consumer’s taste, which corresponds to his
location on the Hotelling line. We assume consumers dislike being targeted, but their disutility
from the amount of targeting that they are exposed to is heterogeneous.
We demonstrate that an increasing amount of ad targeting leads the web platforms to com-
pete more vigorously with each other. Although a larger surplus is created by the better match
between advertiser and consumer, this additional surplus is more than dissipated to consumers,
reducing the platforms’ profits. The intuition is that better ad targeting in particular renders
marginal consumers more profitable to the website. Without targeting, these consumers are not
very valuable to potential advertisers, as these will focus on the average consumer on the web-
site. This changes when the ad can be better matched to the consumer. The higher ad revenues
are channeled through to consumers, as is standard in the competitive bottleneck framework
(see e.g. Anderson and Coate, 2005). But in addition, the higher value of the marginal con-
sumer compared to the inframarginal ones spurs competition among the websites (Crampes,
Haritchabalet and Jullien, 2009).
6Listokin (2015) studies two examples of such programs. TrustE provides private certification, see www.
truste.com/consumer-resources/trusted-directory for a directory of clients, which include firms such as
Apple or Cisco. The Digital Advertising Alliance, DAA, is a trade association, providing privacy standards
for their members. Many large advertisers participate in their self-regulatory program, see www.aboutads.
info/participating. Listokin (2015) argues, however, that such initiatives have only limited success, due to
difficulties in private enforcement and adverse selection of firms into certification.
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In spite of the reduced equilibrium profits, websites maximize targeting when choosing the
level of targeting non-cooperatively, if consumers cannot observe that targeting level. Con-
sumers benefit from the increased competition among websites and from the higher advertising
revenues that decrease website prices, but if average costs associated with loss of privacy are
high, the outcome is socially suboptimal as well. In that case a ban on targeting can be optimal.
Since consumers have heterogeneous costs of privacy loss, one may do better by allowing
websites to differentiate the levels of targeting, as in the example of AT&T. We analyze equi-
librium outcomes when privacy policy sets and enforces two maximum levels of targeting, one
involving high privacy (low targeting) and one with lower privacy and thus more targeting.
Websites now compete in menus of two vertically differentiated products: one with high and
one with low targeting. We demonstrate that high privacy (low targeting) consumers now also
benefit from the more intense competition in the low privacy (high targeting) segment. Prices
in the high privacy segment are dragged down through the marginal effect of those consumers
whose privacy costs are intermediate, such that they are indifferent between the high price,
high privacy product and the low price, low privacy product. We find that a total surplus-
maximizing regulator always allows some targeting on the low privacy segment. Consumer
surplus maximization involves maximal targeting on the low privacy segment.
Our paper is related to the literature on advertising on two-sided platforms, drawing on
Anderson and Coate (2005). We consider the model on a Salop circle, as in Crampes, Har-
itchabalet and Jullien (2009). Their result that with decreasing returns to scale competition
is relaxed ties in with our result on the competitive effect of targeting. In contrast with that
paper, in our model the level of targeting is endogenous.
The marketing literature on targeting and competition (e.g. Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang,
2001; Gal-Or and Gal-Or, 2005; Iyer, Soberman and Villas-Boas, 2005) focuses on targeting
strategies by product suppliers themselves, and shows how this targeting can soften competition.
We find an opposite effect when looking at targeting by intermediators, the website platforms.
Relatedly, recent literature on privacy focuses on its effects on price discrimination by firms
(see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2006, for an overview). If firms can customize not the adver-
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tising, but the prices, based on observed client characteristics, a typical conclusion is that this
leads to lower profits, as demonstrated first in Thisse and Vives (1988). The reason is that
firms will tend to engage in Bertrand competition over each individual consumer. Chen and
Iyer (2002) study a model with advertising and price discrimination, and also find that price
discrimination tends to make those consumers that can choose among different providers to
gain from lower prices. More recently, Taylor and Wagman (2014) analyze, using various mod-
els of competition, who gains and who loses from privacy regulation in models where websites
can use information to price discriminate. In our setting, in contrast, we assume that firms
do not price discriminate in their own product, e.g. because they can coordinate on a uniform
pricing equilibrium which is more profitable for them, but do use consumer information to
improve matching of advertisers to consumers, increasing surplus from the advertising side of
the market.
Our paper incorporates the interaction of competition with privacy concerns and privacy
legislation. Campbell, Goldfarb and Tucker (2015) is a recent study in this direction. They
focus on entry barriers related to scale economies on the consumer side of having to familiarize
oneself with the privacy policies, and having to consent with them.
2. Model
We consider a model of n horizontally differentiated internet firms (‘websites’), competing
for consumers who can be homogeneously mapped to a preference space in the form of a
circle, following Salop (1979). The utility consumers obtain from visiting a website depends
on the distance on the circle between the consumer and the website, as well as on price and
privacy policy. Websites’ revenues come from two sources. First, the websites offer content
to consumers and compete in prices to attract consumers to their sites. In addition, websites
also derive revenues from presenting advertisements to the consumers that visit their site. We
consider a continuum of horizontally differentiated advertisers, uniformly distributed on the
same Salop circle. Advertisers compete perfectly to have their advertisement shown to the
6
websites’ consumers.
The focus of our model will be on the websites’ ability to target advertisements to consumers.
We assume that websites can freely choose the fraction of their subscribers ρ ∈ [0, 1] for which
they gather personal information. Higher ρ means more targeting. When a website has personal
information on a consumer, it uses this information to match the consumer to an advertiser.
Without that information, it shows consumers an ad of the average best match, which is
that of the advertiser located at the same position as the website itself.7 Consumers derive
disutility from the loss of privacy associated with the collection of personal data. Consumers
are heterogeneous in the size of this disutility, θ, and we assume that the distribution of privacy
preferences is independent of the consumers’ location on the circle. Websites cannot observe
the costs θ of individual consumers.
In terms of information, we assume that websites choose their targeting technology ρ and
that this choice is verifiable for the regulator, but not observable to consumers. Advertisers
are able to verify whether their advertisement was targeted or not, but they do not observe ρ
directly.8
2.1. Consumers
We consider a unit mass of consumers uniformly distributed along the Salop circle of horizontal
consumer preferences, parametrized by location x ∈ [0, 1). Consumers subscribe to a single
website (i.e. we consider single-homing on the part of consumers). The utility that a consumer
located at x derives from subscribing to website i located at position xi and charging price pi
equals9
ui(x, θ) = w − t|x− xi| − pi − ρ¯iθ
7The use of Salop’s circular city model rather than the Hotelling line greatly simplifies the location of average
advertiser.
8The verification by advertisers can in practice be done by several mechanisms, like pay-per-view, pay-per-
click, or by the conversion rate (share of advertisement exposures that result in a click-through to the advertisers
own website). More details on such technology can be found in the annex of this paper.
9expressed in terms of some numeraire good
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where |x − xi| ≤ 1/2 is the distance between the consumer and the website along the circle,
t is a travel cost parameter measuring the disalignment between the consumer’s location and
the location of the website, w is the gross utility of consuming the website’s service, which is
assumed the same for all websites and consumers.
If a consumer expects that a website has collected personal information, his utility is re-
duced by θ.10 This privacy cost θ may measure discomfort of being targeted, but might also
include expectations of monetary loss from price discrimination by advertisers when selling
their products, or gains from finding better matched products.11 We assume that θ is indepen-
dently and identically distributed among all consumers, with distribution function F (θ) that
has continuous density on [θL, θH ]. The consumer expects that the website has collected his
personal information with probability ρ¯i, so that ρ¯iθ is the consumer’s expectation of the costs
of privacy loss when subscribing to website i. We focus on rational expectations equilibrium,
where the consumers’ expectation of the websites’ targeting choice corresponds with the actual
equilibrium targeting choice of the website, i.e. ρ¯i = ρi in equilibrium.
2.2. Advertisers
We have a continuum of price-taking advertisers, selling products that can be uniquely located
at coordinate y ∈ [0, 1) on the same preference circle as consumers and websites. Advertisers
enjoy surplus when consumers are exposed to their advertisements on websites.12 The size of
this surplus, and hence the advertiser’s willingness to pay, depends on the quality of the match
between consumer and advertiser.
We parametrize the quality of a match by the arc distance between a consumer’s location
10In addition, consumers could have extra direct (dis-)utility of viewing a targeted advertisement relative to
viewing an untargeted advertisement. We assume that θ captures the net effect of privacy loss and viewing a
targeted advertisement. Note that all consumers are shown exactly one advertisement, which is either targeted
or non-targeted. Any generic disutility of advertisements therefore affects all consumers alike.
11As is well known, price discrimination may have ambiguous effects on welfare (see e.g. Varian, 1989), which
we cannot address here since we do not explicitly model the interactions of advertisers with consumers. We
leave this as a topic for future research.
12We do not explicitly model sales of products. We assume there is some form of competition among suppliers
in differentiated products, and an advertisement may give one supplier a competitive advantage, for instance by
increasing the consumer’s demand for his product, or by directing the consumer first to his product in a model
of directed search.
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x and the advertiser’s location y, as in Wolinsky (1983), and more recently in Chandra (2009)
and De Corniere (Forthcoming). An advertiser y’s perfect match is therefore with the consumer
located at x = y, generating a match surplus ν. For a match with a less aligned consumer, the
advertiser’s surplus equals a(|x − y|), with a(.) > 0 a decreasing function of the arc distance
between consumer and advertiser. This decrease represents the costs of a mismatch. We denote
the value of a perfect match by ν = a(0).
Advertisers contract with the websites to have their advertisement shown to (some of) the
platforms’ consumers. Each time a consumer visits a website, the website has the opportunity
to place one advertisement. We assume that this advertising space is sold at a price that
extracts all rents of the advertiser - advertisers are price takers.
2.3. Websites
The n websites are located on the circle at equal distances 1/n from each other. Website i sets
the subscription price pi for consumers, and sells ad space aimed at each individual consumer to
the advertisers. Since consumers single-home, websites are competitive bottlenecks and extract
monopoly surplus from the advertisers (as in Armstrong, 2006). We focus on the case where
all consumers subscribe to a website.
We model the choice of targeting intensity by allowing the websites to choose the proportion
ρi of their customers for which they collect personal information. For simplicity, we assume
that information collection is costless; adding a cost does not materially affect the analysis.13
When a website has personal information on a consumer it can identify his true position on
the line x with probability one. We assume that the probability that a website has personal
information on a customer is independent from his location x.14
For those customers whose position the website can exactly identify, it will sell the available
advertisement space to the matching advertiser at y = x, at price ν, the advertiser’s willingness
to pay for an exact match.
For the 1− ρi consumers of website i’s content that the website cannot target, the website
13In appendix B, we show how inclusion of a targeting cost affects the main results of section 3.
14Websites have no prior information that allows them to stratify customers before collecting information.
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cannot find perfectly matching advertisers. It does have some information: those consumers’
choice of visiting website i rather than another website signals that these consumers are likely
to be close to website i. The website will sell advertising space to that advertiser that will
bring the greatest match surplus contingent on consumers visiting website i. In a symmetric
situation, this best match will be the advertiser located at the same position as the website,
y = xi. The price charged for this advertising space will be the advertiser’s surplus averaged
over all consumers that visit this website.
For a given choice of ρi, website i’s expected surplus from selling an advertisement to a
consumer located at distance |x− xi| from the platform’s location will then be equal to:
a(x− xi, ρi) ≡ ρiν + (1− ρi)a(x− xi).
The timing of the model now is that first websites choose targeting intensities ρi and prices
pi. They contract on a per-consumer price with advertisers who can verify whether the adver-
tisement was well-targeted. After all websites have set prices pi and targeting intensities ρi,
consumers observe prices pi and form expectations over ρi. They then choose which website to






pi+1 − pi + (ρ¯i+1 − ρ¯i)θ
2t
from website i.
We assume that in the equilibrium, prices pi are positive. In a free subscription model,
websites would need another strategic parameter, such as quality, to compete for consumers.
Depending on the nature of investments in quality, one might identify such quality choices with
a negative contribution to prices.
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3. Targeting and competition
We first consider the competitive equilibrium without regulation. We show that the degree
of targeting chosen by the websites affects the intensity of competition among those websites:
more precise targeting leads to more intense competition. Yet, ex ante, individual websites find
it a dominant strategy to increase their level of targeting ρi.
To see this, consider a symmetric equilibrium with all websites choosing the same targeting





where di is the distance between the website’s most remote customer and the website itself.
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a(|x|)dx, and a¯(d, ρ) = ρν + (1− ρ)a¯(d)
is the average advertising income over all consumers subscribing to website i, without targeting
(ρ = 0) and with targeting ρ, respectively.
For ρ < 1, advertising income a(d, ρ) is decreasing with the marginal consumer’s distance d
from the website, the average is higher than the marginal value a¯(d, ρ)−a(d, ρ) = (1−ρ)(a¯(d)−
a(d)) > 0, and profits are larger than in the case of perfect targeting ρ = 1. In terms of the
analysis of Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009), this is a case of decreasing returns to
15Normalizing the website’s location xi = 0; the absolute location of the website does not affect its profits.
16We do assume that prices are positive, i.e. t/n is large compared to advertising income.
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audience size.
Finally, since the difference between the marginal and the average advertising revenues
decreases with accuracy of targeting ρ, we have the result that
Proposition 1 In the symmetric equilibrium, profits are decreasing in the degree of targeting
ρ.
The intuition is that an increase in targeting precision ρ increases the value to the website
of marginal consumers. Without targeting, advertising impressions on marginal consumers are
of low value, since advertisements are tailored to the average consumer. This means that in
that case, an additional marginal consumer does not allow the website to increase his revenues
from advertisers very much. With targeting, this changes: with perfect targeting, the marginal
consumer is as valuable to the website as any inframarginal consumer, as each consumer is linked
with its optimal advertiser, providing the website with advertising income ν. Targeting takes
away the mismatch between consumer and advertiser, and this mismatch is greater for marginal
consumers. This increase in value of the marginal consumer, in turn, heats up competition
between adjacent websites for this consumer, and as a result profits go down.
If websites could coordinate on targeting, proposition 1 suggests that they might want to
agree to keep targeting to a minimum. However, we next show that individually, websites
win by increasing the accuracy of targeting over that of their competitors, so that in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, maximal targeting results.17
Proposition 2 Websites gain by increasing the accuracy of targeting ρ above that of their
rivals. As a result, in the symmetric equilibrium all websites will choose maximum allowed
targeting.
The websites’ problem is that they cannot commit toward their consumers on the level of
targeting, ρi. As a consequence of the strategic interaction outlined in proposition 2, they
are caught in a prisoners’ dilemma. The only equilibrium is where each website chooses the
17The proof, and those of subsequent results, are in the appendix.
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maximum level of targeting: more targeting is individually profitable as consumers do not
observe changes in targeting, so cannot respond by changing their decision in response to such
an individual increase of targeting.
Maximum targeting is undesirable from the point of view of the websites: from proposition
1, the websites’ profits are smallest at maximum ρ, and they would be better off when targeting
is not possible at all. But also social welfare may be suboptimal at this equilibrium. Although
the improved matching of advertisers to consumers under increasing targeting raises advertiser
surplus and hence websites’ revenues from advertisers – and this benefit is fully passed through
to consumers in the form of lower website prices – consumers who experience privacy costs with
increased targeting may lose out.
Intervention by a planner may therefore be welfare improving if the average costs of privacy
loss are sufficiently large.18 Let us here first consider the welfare effects of a simple privacy
regulation that puts a maximum on the extent of targeting allowed by websites, ρmax ≤ 1. Such
a regulation provides a credible commitment for websites to keep targeting accuracy ρ at this
bound, and is therefore clearly beneficial for them.
The analysis of the effect on consumer surplus is also straightforward in the model. Since
both price and privacy costs are linear in ρ, consumers prefer either full targeting, ρ = 1, or no
targeting at all, ρ = 0. Average surplus per consumer is given by19
CS = w − p− ρθ˜












and a(·; ρ) = ρν + (1− ρ)a(·), we find that the optimal value of ρ depends only on the sign of
ν − a( 1
2n
)− θ˜.
18In addition, there will be costs of enforcement, which we ignore in this analysis, but which in a full analysis
would be traded off against the welfare benefits of regulation.
19ignoring average transportation costs, which are independent of ρ. Also, recall that we assume full coverage,
or w high enough that all consumers participate.
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Total surplus, in turn, depends not on the marginal value of advertising, but on the average
value per consumer, and its trade-off with average privacy costs. Summarizing,
Corollary 1 1. Producer surplus is maximized for ρ = 0.
2. Consumer surplus is maximized at ρ = 0 iff ν − a( 1
2n
) < θ˜. Otherwise, ρ = 1 maximizes
CS.
3. Total surplus is maximized at ρ = 0 iff ν − a¯( 1
2n
) < θ˜. Otherwise, ρ = 1 maximizes total
surplus.
If average privacy costs θ˜ are sufficiently high, a welfare maximizing regulator takes into
account consumer costs of privacy and restricts targeting. In this way it helps the websites
circumventing their commitment problem, raising profits and increasing welfare at the same
time. Consumers themselves are less averse to targeting: while they incur privacy costs, they
benefit from the effect of targeting on competition intensity, lowering prices.20
Increasing the number of websites n not only reduces prices and profits through the usual
channel of increased competition among websites. It also improves advertising efficiency without
targeting, as consumers’ platform choice now more accurately reveals their location along the
circle. Hence, both the average match value with advertisers, a¯( 1
2n
), and the marginal match
value a( 1
2n
), are larger, which increases advertising income and decreases prices. This means
that the relative value of any targeting carried out by the websites (increasing ρ) decreases,
and high-targeting will be optimal less often.
In our benchmark model, we have made the assumption that websites cannot commit to a
targeting intensity ρi. Relaxing that assumption, let us briefly explore a model where consumers
can reliably observe the ρi set by each website.
21 In that case, the targeting intensity acts
20The fact that the welfare maximizing regulator treats prices as welfare neutral relies on our assumption
that all consumers participate in the market, so that there is no deadweight loss as a result of high prices. With
price-elastic consumption, a welfare maximizing regulator would choose ρ weakly higher to reduce prices and
increase consumption.
21Though for consumers it will be hard to directly verify the level of information collection by an individual
website, websites might create a reputation for non-targeting. The internet search engine DuckDuckGo, for
instance, emphasizes that it does not use historical search profiles, thus making itself more attractive to con-
sumers that value their privacy more. Relatedly, websites might opt for private certification of their privacy
policies, for instance by cooperating with do-not-track-me services.
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as another strategic parameter that influences consumer decisions, apart from price pi. The
websites optimize their choice of targeting intensity taking into account consumer response,
unlike in the case when ρ is not observable.
Solving the Nash equilibrium in ρi in addition to price pi, we straightforwardly find that, in
the symmetric equilibrium, websites choose ρi to maximize the difference of average advertizing
surplus and average consumers’ privacy costs,









This result is familiar from the theory of two-part tariffs: websites maximize joint surplus with
their consumers, and use the fixed part of the tariff, in our case price pi, to extract that surplus
to the extent allowed by competition.
In our linear model, this entails an equilibrium choice ρi = 1 as long as ν − a¯( 12n) > θ˜, and
ρi = 0 otherwise. Note that this exactly coincides with the total surplus maximizing choice, as
both the website and the welfare maximizer are now aligned in maximizing total surplus from
targeting. Consumers, as before, prefer higher ρ, as they are concerned with price levels, and
take into account the higher surplus they obtain as higher targeting intensity drives competition
up and prices down.
Likewise, even though websites now can commit vis-a-vis consumers, they still choose exces-
sive targeting from a profit maximization point of view, as they ignore the effect their targeting
choice has on the intensity of competition, and hence on profits. In this sense, the ordering
of targeting preferences is preserved if we allow for commitment on ρ: websites would prefer
lower targeting than the welfare optimal level, while consumers in contrast favour higher levels
of targeting. It is the effect on competition intensity that drives this wedge in preferences, as in
our base case analysis. If websites could also commit to a value of ρ vis-a-vis their rivals, they
would always prefer coordination on ρ = 0, as this reduces competition and increases prices
just as in our base case.
Finally, one might ask whether the websites might use the information they have on con-
sumers to offer customized prices to consumers, instead of offering uniform prices as we assume
15
here. Such pricing based on consumer characteristics has been studied in a literature going back
to the seminal paper by Thisse and Vives (1988), see also Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006)
for a survey. As stressed in these papers, in price competition models such as the one we study,
customised prices essentially make firms compete a` la Bertrand over each individual consumer,
as they do not have to trade off any losses on inframarginal consumers when they lower prices
to attract the marginal consumers. Equilibrium prices and profits in such models then typically
go down if firms use customer information to price discriminate. In this paper, we assume that
the websites do succeed in avoiding that equilibrium, for instance because they can more easily
observe each other’s pricing policies and can collude on refraining from such customised pric-
ing.22 In a model with customised prices, our main results would not continue to hold, as they
hinge on the observation that more targeting intensifies competition on the marginal consumer
and drag down prices for inframarginal consumers as a result. With customized prices, price
competition would already be maximal, and no further gain on competition will arise from
targeting the advertising.
4. Segmentation of the market
Consumers benefit from increased targeting via pass-through of higher advertising surplus
(driven by the average value of advertising revenue per consumer), as well as from the more
intense competition between websites (reflected in the difference between marginal and average
advertising revenue). These benefits are equal for all consumers.
In contrast, consumers are heterogeneous in the costs they experience from loss of privacy
that goes hand-in-hand with improved targeting. Those with high privacy costs θ may prefer a
lower level of targeting, while those with lower θ will value the benefits higher than the costs.
It therefore makes sense to explore privacy regulations that allow for differentiation in
targeting between low- and high-cost consumers. Again, the problem for the website is that
22An alternative would be to use a model where consumer prices are zero, and websites compete on quality
parameters that cannot easily be differentiated among consumers.
16
of commitment. The websites themselves cannot tailor their levels of targeting to consumer
preferences directly, since that level is not observable for consumers. The planner, on the other
hand, may help by setting and enforcing a menu of maximum levels for targeting that consumers
can choose from.
Let us assume that the planner can set two levels of privacy: one where websites first ask
consent (and which consumers can opt out of, e.g. cookies, do-not-track), ρmin. And second,
a maximum level of targeting for those consumers who are willing to give up some privacy in
return for lower prices or better quality, ρmax. Government enforced maximum targeting levels
allow websites to credibly offer two vertically differentiated products to consumers, one with a
government-enforced high level of privacy protection (low targeting), and one which allows a
higher degree of targeting by the website.
Consistent with the websites’ incentives to increase their level of targeting up to the bound
set by the planner, from proposition 2, websites will thus compete in two, vertically differ-
entiated offers, each with a different price. Consumers opting for the high privacy product
experience minimal targeting ρmin, and pay price ph, while those opting for the low privacy
subscription will pay the (lower) price pl, and be exposed to greater targeting ρmax. Hence,
this leaves consumers with utility
uhi (θ) = w − phi − ρminθ − travel costs, uli(θ) = w − pli − ρmaxθ − travel costs.
We denote the marginal consumer privacy type indifferent between website i’s high and low




and those consumers with low (or even negative) θ prefer the cheaper low privacy option to the
more expensive high privacy one. Furthermore, we assume that the range of θ’s is sufficiently
large to ensure that the equilibrium θ¯ is not a corner solution. Having θL < ν − a¯( 12n) and
θH > ν − a( 12n) makes sure of that.
Websites compete on both products, taking into account the elasticity of substitution of
17
consumers between the low and the high privacy products. We have total profits of website i











≡ F (θ¯i)pili + (1− F (θ¯i))pihi .
These total profits are a weighted average of website i’s per-consumer profits pili on the low-




In the high privacy segment h the website will target with intensity ρmin. This means
that on the high privacy segment, we have perfect matching with probability ρmin, while with
probability 1− ρmin, the advertiser with the best average match is displayed to the user. The
same holds on the low privacy segment with targeting intensity ρmax, so that
ahi (|x|; ρmin) = ρminν + (1− ρmin)a(|x|), ali(|x|; ρmax) = ρmaxν + (1− ρmax)a(|x|).
In this two regime set-up we find that the competitive effects of targeting that we found
before have spill-over effects among the two regimes:
Proposition 3 When websites can offer both a high privacy (low targeting at ρmin) product
and a low privacy (high targeting at ρmax) product, in the symmetric equilibrium with consumer
segmentation, high-privacy consumers benefit from the presence of the low privacy market:
prices are lower than without this second market. Similarly, prices for the low-privacy product
are higher than they would be in the absence of the high-privacy product.
With only a single targeting regime, we have profit optimization per consumer in that
regime. Now, with two targeting regimes, we have an additional effect: changing prices on
one segment not only leads to gains or losses of consumers to rival websites. It also causes
some marginal consumers to switch from the low to the high privacy segment on the same
website, or vice versa. Since these segments generate different profits per consumer pih,l, this
switching will affect price setting by the website: the website wants to reduce the incentives of
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high privacy consumers to switch to the lower priced, and lower profit, low privacy segment.
Without such switching, we had, by proposition 1, pil < pih: the high-privacy h market is
less competitive. When the two markets are both present, and linked through the marginal θ¯-
consumer, we see that in equilibrium prices are reduced on the high-privacy segment, compared
to the single targeting regime. And vice versa, prices are raised on the low-privacy segment.
Hence, high-privacy users benefit from the stronger competition on the low-privacy segment,
and vice versa.
As a next step, we solve explicitly for the resulting prices, given levels of targeting ρmin, ρmax,
Lemma 1 Equilibrium prices for high and low privacy products satisfy
pl + a(d, ρmax) = 2td− (θ¯ − ν + a(d))∆ρ(1− F ) (3)
ph + a(d, ρmin) = 2td+ (θ¯ − ν + a(d))∆ρF, (4)
with d = 1
2n






2td(θ¯ − ν + a¯(d)) + F (θ¯)(1− F (θ¯))
f(θ¯)
∆ρ(θ¯ − ν + a(d)) = 0. (5)
In particular,
ν − a¯(d) < θ¯ < ν − a(d). (6)
Recall that with a single level of targeting, we had p+ a(d, ρ) = 2td. From the expressions
for prices with different levels of targeting, equations (3),(4), we see that pl is indeed higher
than when in isolation, and vice versa ph is lower, since θ¯ − ν + a < 0. This is consistent with
proposition 3.
We can now again turn to the regulator’s choice of optimal ρmin,max. For that, we first use
lemma 1 to write down the explicit expressions for profits, total welfare and consumer surplus.
Lemma 2 Total website profits, Π, equal
Π = 2td+ a¯(d)− a(d)− ρmax
∫ θ¯
θL





with d = 1
2n
. Total welfare is given by
TW = w + a¯(d) + ρmax
∫ θ¯
θL
(ν − a¯(d)− θ)dF + ρmin
∫ θH
θ¯
(ν − a¯(d)− θ)dF (8)
and consumer surplus
CS = w − 2td+ a(d) + ρmax
∫ θ¯
θL
(ν − a(d)− θ)dF + ρmin
∫ θH
θ¯
(ν − a(d)− θ)dF (9)
Now let us explore the combinations of targeting levels ρmin, ρmax that optimize these ex-
pressions. In doing so, we have to take into account that changing these targeting levels also
changes the marginal consumer’s privacy cost θ¯. That changes with ∆ρ according to equation
(5).
As in the single-targeting analysis, we find that welfare maximization involves higher tar-
geting intensity than the profit-maximizing choice for websites, while consumers benefit even
more from targeting:
Proposition 4 Websites optimize their profits when targeting is banned, ρmin = ρmax = 0. To-
tal welfare maximization requires positive targeting, ρmax > 0. Consumer surplus is maximized
by allowing full targeting for the low-privacy segment, ρmax = 1.
The result for websites is immediate: they pass on any gains from advertising in the form of
lower prices, and they suffer as before from higher competition as a result of targeting. Total
welfare, on the other hand, benefits when adding a choice for some targeting in addition to the
no-targeting product. As long as the marginal welfare gain from targeting, ν − a¯(d) , exceeds
the privacy costs θL of the lowest type consumers, adding targeting is strictly optimal.
For consumers, the gain from targeting is higher: they also take into account the benefits
in terms of fiercer competition, driving down prices. In fact, from equation (6), even for the
marginal consumer, with privacy cost θ¯, the marginal consumer benefits ν − a(d) of increased
targeting in the high-targeting regime outweigh the privacy cost. As a result, it is optimal to
maximally increase the maximum targeting level.
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We cannot make similar definitive statements on ρmin. Whether raising ρmin above zero
can be optimal will depend on the actual distributions of θ and the values of a and a¯, as the
following example illustrates.
Example Let us consider a uniform distribution of privacy costs θ ∈ [0, B]. In that case,
equation (5) for the relation between the marginal consumer’s privacy costs θ¯ and targeting




θ¯ − ν + a¯
ν − a− θ¯































over ρmax and ∆ρ. Note that, as ∆ρ increases from 0 to 1, θ¯ increases monotonically from
ν − a¯ to some intermediate value θ∗ between ν − a¯ < θ∗ < ν − a. Hence optimization over ∆ρ








By proposition 4, we have that ρmax = 1 in the optimum. Writing ρmin = 1 − ∆ρ, and




(ν − a− θ)dθ.
It is convenient to do the equivalent maximization with respect to θ¯ (over the range [ν− a¯, θ∗]),







(ν − a− θ)dθ + ∆ρ(ν − a− θ¯).
The second term is always positive. For the first, it depends on the sign of the integral. If
ν − a is large, so that there are large benefits of targeting, the optimum will be at ∆ρ = 0, i.e.
ρmin = 1 as well. Conversely, if ν − a is small, the optimum consumer surplus will be attained
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at ∆ρ = 1, with θ¯ = θ∗. In that case, consumer surplus is maximized by having a full privacy
product, ρmin = 0.
Let us also investigate the total welfare maximizing choices for ρmax, ρmin in this example.
Looking at the total welfare expression (8), and writing down the first-order conditions for both
ρmin and ρmax, it is immediately clear that these cannot both hold with equality: if ν− a¯ < 1
2
B,
the average consumer privacy costs, necessarily we have a corner solution ρmin = 0. And vice
versa, for ν− a¯ > 1
2
B, we find ρmax = 1. We can then solve for the other parameter to optimize
welfare. With B = 1, and taking as an example the former case, ν − a¯ < 1
2
– which means
that even without targeting a lot of advertising income can be realized – we have ρmin = 0 and




(ν − a¯− θ)dθ.
With large difference between average and marginal advertising income, a¯ and a, increasing ρ
means increasing θ¯ by a lot, which means exposing many higher cost consumers to maximal
targeting. In that case, optimally, ρmax = ∆ρ is smaller than one, and we have positive but
limited targeting ρmax for the low type consumers. If, on the other hand, the difference between
marginal and average advertising costs is small, optimization results in ρmax = 1.
Summarizing, we find that allowing targeting on consumers that opt for targeting will be
good for total welfare. From a consumer welfare perspective, a higher targeting intensity is
preferred, since apart from better matches, also the increased competition among websites
contributes to consumer welfare. This higher targeting on consumers who place low value on
privacy also drives down prices on the high privacy segment, as competition effects spill over
to those consumers.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we explored the interaction between competition among internet platforms and
the degree of ad targeting they use. More targeting implies stronger competition. Yet, since
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websites cannot commit to low targeting intensity, they are caught in a prisoners’ dilemma:
each firm individually benefits from increased targeting. In the equilibrium, websites will there-
fore drive up targeting. On the one hand, this reduces consumer prices, because of improved
matching of consumers with advertisers. However, if consumers dislike the loss of privacy that
is a consequence of targeting, privacy policy can lead to better outcomes than the laissez-faire
outcome. In that case, also websites can benefit from the less intense competition that goes
with this commitment to privacy protection.
In practice, consumers are heterogeneous in the costs they associate with loss of privacy. By
allowing websites to offer multiple products, differing in the degree of targeting and price they
offer, welfare can be increased. In this case, even those consumers that opt for the high privacy
(and low targeting) product benefit: their prices are reduced as a result of the endogenously
higher competition on the low privacy market segment.
Our paper provides a general discussion of welfare trade-offs in the presence of heterogeneous
privacy concerns among consumers and websites with market power. Potential extensions could
provide a more elaborate analysis of the welfare effects of private certification of targeting
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A. Proofs
Proof of proposition 2 Consider a hypothetical symmetric equilibrium characterized by ρ, p
for all websites, and consumer expectations ρ¯ = ρ. In that case, since market share 2di does







2di(p+ a¯(di, ρ)) = 2di(ν − a¯(di)) > 0
and hence a symmetric equilibrium must have maximum allowed ρ. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 With profits
Πi = F (θ¯i)pi
l
i + (1− F (θ¯i))pihi ,
and the marginal consumer’s privacy cost θ¯ given by
θ¯i =
phi − pli
ρmax − ρmin ,













ρmax − ρmin . (11)
Following our previous analysis, competition on the high-privacy market h is less intense, so







so that ph < ph
∗
= t/n − a(d; ρmin) and pl > pl∗ = t/n − a(d; ρmax), where stars denote the
price for a single market with level of targeting ρmin or ρmax, given in equation (2). Hence,
high-privacy users benefit from the stronger competition on the low-privacy segment, and vice
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versa.















Now, substituting into the first-order conditions for low and high prices, equations (10,11), we








(pl + al(d)) =
f
F∆ρ





(ph + ah(d)) = − f
(1− F )∆ρ2d(p
l − ph + a¯l − a¯h),
and subtracting these, we find the condition for the privacy costs θ¯ of consumer who is indifferent
between high and low privacy products,
2td
(




θ¯ − ν + a) = 0.
Here we used that ph− pl = θ¯∆ρ, and ah = ρminν+ (1− ρmin)a, al = ρmaxν+ (1− ρmax)a, with
∆ρ = ρmax − ρmin.
From that condition for θ¯, and a¯ > a, it directly follows that
ν − a¯(d) < θ¯ < ν − a(d).
Finally, we solve for ph and pl separately, plugging in the condition for θ¯ into the first-order
conditions. This gives equations (3,4). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4 It is clear from the expression for total profits Π, (7), that from the
point of view of the websites, banning targeting altogether (ρmax = 0 = ρmin) maximizes profits.
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The reason is similar as before: this maximizes the wedge between the advertising income of
the marginal consumer a(d), and the average advertising income exceeds the marginal one,
a¯(d) > a(d).
From a welfare point of view, allowing some targeting is always desirable. Consider the






(ν − a¯− θ)dF + ∆ρ(ν − a¯− θ¯)f(θ¯) dθ¯
d∆ρ
.
Note that at ρmax = ρmin = 0, we have from lemma 1 that θ¯ = ν − a¯ since ∆ρ = 0. Hence, the
first term is positive at that point, while the second vanishes. The first-order effect of raising
ρmax above zero is therefore positive.
Since θ¯ < ν − a for any value of ∆ρ, the first integral expression in the corresponding






(ν − a− θ)dF + ∆ρ(ν − a− θ¯)f(θ¯) dθ¯
d∆ρ
.
is always positive and raising ρmax above zero certainly increases consumer surplus. In fact,
since θ¯ increases with ∆ρ, it is optimal for consumers to set ρmax equal to one. The reason is
that for all consumers opting for the low privacy product, the gain from lower prices outweighs
the loss in privacy. Q.E.D.
B. Results with costly targeting
Here we explore the effects of costly targeting. Suppose websites incur costs cρ when choosing




(p+ a(|x|, ρ)− cρ)dx.
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so in equilibrium, costs are reflected in prices. The website’s profits, given the level of targeting















and proposition 1 remains unaffected by the introduction of targeting costs. If a website
increases its targeting intensity, keeping prices and consumer expectations fixed, there is now
a cost in addition to the benefits of increased advertising income (as in proposition 2). As long
as the difference between average advertising surplus with and without targeting, ν − a¯(d),
is higher than the marginal cost of targeting c, websites gain from increased targeting and
proposition 2 remains intact. With high costs of targeting, an individual website is better off
without any targeting, so ρ = 0 in the symmetric equilibrium and the prisoner’s dilemma is
not present.
On average, consumers compare the effects of price with loss of privacy, ρθ˜, where θ˜ is the
average privacy cost parameter. With targeting costs c included in the prices, consumers on
the whole prefer full targeting as long as ν − a( 1
2n
) > θ˜+ c, while total surplus is maximized at
ρ = 1 as long as ν − a¯( 1
2n
) > θ˜+ c. Corollary 1 therefore remains valid as long as privacy costs
θ are replaced with θ + c.
29
